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The TV industry is a two-sided market where both advertisers and viewers buy access to the 
programs offered by competing TV channels. Under the current market structure advertising 
prices are typically set by TV channels while viewer prices are set by distributors (e.g. cable 
operators). The latter implies that the distributors partly internalize the competition between 
the TV channels, since they take into account the fact that a lower viewer price at one channel 
will harm rival channels. We nonetheless find that a shift to a market structure where both 
advertising prices and viewer prices are set competitively by the TV channels might increase 
joint industry profits. The reason is that this market structure, in contrast to the one we 
observe today, directly addresses the two-sidedness of the market. We also show that this is to 
the benefit for the viewers. 
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It is well known that ￿rms which sell competing products can raise pro￿ts by del-
egating pricing decisions to a third party that partly or fully internalizes compe-
tition. It is quite intuitive that ￿rms in traditional one-sided markets can bene￿t
from such horizontal price coordination, but we show that one should be careful in
applying similar arrangements in two-sided markets. Indeed, that might be counter-
productive, since it undermines the ￿rms￿abilities to choose e¢ cient price structures.
Firms in two-sided markets cater to two distinct groups of customers that are
connected through quantity spillovers, and the ￿rms maximize pro￿t by facilitating
value-creating interactions between the two groups. Two-sided platforms operate
in many economically signi￿cant industries, such as the media sector, the ￿nancial
sector (payment card systems), real-estate brokerage, and the computing industry
(computer operating systems, software, game consoles etc.). The price structure
in two-sided markets must account for interactions between the demands of di⁄er-
ent customer groups and the externalities that arise in these relationships.2 For
instance, in the media industry, advertising may be perceived as a nuisance (a neg-
ative externality) by readers/viewers, while advertisers bene￿t from an increase in
readers/viewers of the media outlet. In the credit card industry there are positive
quantity spillovers between merchants and cardholders. Merchants who accept a
credit card welcome an increase in the number of households joining the credit card
system, and vice versa.
This paper is motivated by the TV industry, a two-sided market that serves both
advertisers and viewers. Previously, free-to-air channels dominated the market, and
the channels competed ￿ercly in the advertising markets to raise revenue. However,
partly due to technological progresses which make it possible to exclude non-paying
viewers, the industry now raises a large share of its revenue directly from the audi-
ence. Nonetheless, we do not see ￿erce price competition between the channels in
the end-user market. The reason for this is that the viewers must buy access to the
TV channels through a distributor, and under the current market structure it is the
2Evans (2003a,b) provides examples and classi￿cations of two-sided markets.
1distributor - and not the TV channels - who sets viewer prices. In this sense the
distributor acts as a price coordinator for the TV channels.
Obviously, such horizontal coordination of prices tends to increase prices and
thus pro￿ts compared to a situation where the prices are set in a competitive envi-
ronment.3 The problem is that the distributor does not internalize the fact that high
end-user prices have a negative impact on advertising revenue for the TV channels
through reducing the size of the audiences. An alternative market structure is one
where the TV channels non-cooperatively set both advertising and viewer prices.
Then each channel will take into account the interdependence between the two sides
of the market, and thus coordinate the prices vertically. We show that such a shift
from horizontal to vertical coordination of prices can be bene￿cial for the industry
as well as for the viewers. This market structure, which we label open network, is
expected to become more common in the future.4
To understand the bene￿ts of an open network - i.e. vertical coordination of
prices - consider the special case where the two products are independent in viewers￿
demand (unrelated). Then there is no horizontal coordination problem, since the
TV channels are monopolies in each their market segment. Therefore individual
pro￿t maximization coincides with industry optimum when each TV channel sets
both end-user and advertising prices. If the distributor sets end-user prices, on the
other hand, there is no vertical coordination. The distributor sets higher end-user
prices than those that maximize joint pro￿ts, because it does not take into account
the negative e⁄ect of high end-user prices on the advertising revenues.
If the viewers perceive the TV channels as substitutes rather than as unrelated
products, an open network will no longer lead to the optimal outcome for the in-
dustry. With no horizontal coordination of end-user prices, competition forces those
prices down. This implies that joint pro￿ts for the TV channels and the distributor
3Note that this holds independent of whether a distributor sells channels a-la carte or o⁄ers
di⁄erent channel packages (which we abstract from).
4One reason is the growth in broadband internet connections for private households that makes
it possible for TV channels to bypass the traditional distributor. In some countries, for example in
Norway and Denmark, we have also seen a debate about whether TV channels should have direct
access to the viewers in the existing networks and set end-user prices for their own products.
2are lower the closer substitutes the TV channels￿products are. Interestingly, with
the present market structure - where the distributor sets the end-user prices to the
viewers - the opposite is true. Tougher competition forces the TV channels to limit
their amount of advertising (it is well documented that viewers dislike ads). Such a
competitive pressure dampens the negative externality from the advertiser market
to the viewer market. Since a smaller amount of advertising makes each TV chan-
nel more attractive for the viewers, it enables the industry to achieve higher joint
pro￿ts through higher revenues from the end-users. The closer substitutes the TV
channels￿products are, the higher aggregate pro￿ts can be achieved.
Vertical coordination is thus most important for the industry if TV channels are
very di⁄erentiated, while horizontal coordination is most important if the viewers
perceive the channels as close substitutes. No surprise, then, that we ￿nd that
an open network is superior to the present market structure if the TV channels￿
products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated. More surprisingly, we show that an open
network might lead to the highest aggregate pro￿ts even when the TV channels are
close substitutes. The reason for this is that an open network, in contrast to the
present market structure, directly addresses the two-sidedness of the market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we relate our
study to the existing literature. In section 3 we present the rules of the game and our
model. In Section 4 we solve the game for the market structure where the distributor
sets end-user prices, while we in Section 5 solve the game for the market structure
with open networks. The outcome in those two market structures are compared in
Section 6, and in Section 7 we o⁄er some concluding remarks.
2 Related literature
Media industries in general, and the TV industry in particular, have been the subject
of a number of important studies. The earlier studies were mostly concerned about
how the market structure a⁄ected the program pro￿le.5 More recent studies - such
5In Steiner (1952), which was extended in Beebe (1977), it is discussed how a change from
monopoly to oligopoly could change the program pro￿le. Spence and Owen (1977) discuss how the
3as Gabszewicz, et al. (2004), Anderson and Coate (2005), and Kind, et al. (2007,
2009) - have emphasized how important it is to take the view that these industries
are two-sided markets, serving both content consumers and advertisers, two groups
that exert externalities on each other. In the present paper, we bring this discussion
a step further, by taking into account the fact that TV viewers are served through
distribution of TV signals to the households.6 What we ￿nd is that the industry￿ s
two-sidedness creates a need for coordinating viewer prices and advertising prices
that is not present in one-sided industries. Accordingly, there is less scope for the
distributor, or retailer, to keep control of prices to consumers when the industry is
two-sided.
We are, of course, not the ￿rst to discuss vertical relations between TV channels
and TV distributors.7 One strand of the literature focuses mainly on the e⁄ects of
exclusive distribution of premium content, and there is no or very little discussion of
the role played by advertising on the issue of exclusive distribution; see Armstrong
(1999), Stennek (2007), Hagiu and Lee (2009), and Weeds (2009). In a slightly
di⁄erent vein, Crawford and Cullen (2007) and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2009)
discuss a TV distributor￿ s bundling of TV channels; again, the role of advertising
on TV is not studied.
In two-sided markets where distribution plays a key role, as is the case in most
media industries, it is crucial to understand the interplay between the externalities
between user groups on the one hand and the way the services are delivered and
priced on the other. The only other paper we know of that discusses the role of
distribution in a two-sided market is Bel, et al. (2007). In contrast to us, however,
they focus on a situation where one ￿rm is vertically integrated, controlling both
the distribution and the program production. They do not compare regimes where
either distributors or TV channels set end-user prices, as we do here.
￿nancing of a TV channel - by user payment (pay TV) or advertising - a⁄ects the program pro￿le.
6The distribution is through either digital terrestrial TV, direct broadcast satellites, or cables.
Since the recent digitization of the TV industry, analogue free-to-air transmission has declined.
7Incidentally, vertical relations are an issue also in Barros, et al. (2004), but they focus on
relations between media ￿rms and advertisers, rather than between media ￿rms and distributors,
as we do here.
4With our focus on relations between producers and their distributor, we con-
tribute to the more general literature on vertical relations by taking up an issue
particularly pertinent to two-sided markets: a ￿rm in a two-sided market should
coordinate its prices to its two user groups.8 Such coordination is di¢ cult if control
over end-user prices for consumers is with the distributor.
3 The model
We consider a setting with two competing TV channels earning revenues from adver-
tising and consumer payments. The level of advertising in TV channel i is denoted
Ai; and consumer demand is denoted Ci, i = 1;2. The TV channels transmit their
contents through a distributor, i.e., a downstream ￿rm that the upstream TV chan-
nels must go through in order to reach the viewers.
We compare two di⁄erent market structures. In market structure D, the dis-
tributor is the price setter in the end-user market, receiving a price pi ￿ 0 from
each viewer. At the same time, TV channel i receives a price fi ? 0 for each
viewer in addition to a ￿xed fee Fi ? 0 from the distributor. TV channel i sets a
price of advertising ri on its own channel. This market structure mirrors the one
which is presently observed in most TV markets, where the distributor sets prices
to end-users.
In market structure T, the distributor has no price-setting role. Instead, TV
channel i sets both the price it charges from its viewers (pi) and the advertising
price, ri. The payment from TV channel i to the distributor is equal to wi ? 0
per viewer plus a ￿xed fee Wi ? 0. We label this setting an open network market
structure.
Below, we consider a three-stage game. The access prices, F (or W) and f (or
w), are presumably the least ￿ exible of the prices we consider. We therefore assume
that these are determined jointly by the distributor and the TV channels at stage
1. It further seems reasonable to assume that viewer prices are ￿xed in the short
8See e.g. Katz (1989) and Rey and Tirole (2007) for surveys of vertical relations in one-sided
markets.
5run, since end-users typically sign contracts with a distributor for a certain period
of time. Advertising prices, on the other hand, are quite ￿ exible, since these can
easily be changed by the TV channels. In line with this, we assume that end-user
prices and advertising prices are set at stages 2 and 3, respectively.
We follow Kind et al. (2007, 2009) and let consumer preferences be given by the
following quadratic utility function:

















The parameter s 2 [0;1) is a measure of product di⁄erentiation; the viewers perceive
the TV channels￿products as completely unrelated if s = 0 and as perfect substitutes
in the limit as s ! 1.9
Consumer surplus depends not only on the price that the consumers are charged
for the TV channels, but also on the level of advertising. To capture this dependency,
we let the generalized price for watching channel i be given by Gi ￿ pi+￿Ai, where ￿
measures the consumers￿disutility of being interrupted by ads.10 Consumer surplus
can thus be written as
CS = U ￿ (G1C1 + G2C2):
We choose the unit size of advertising Ai such that we can set ￿ = 1. From the












; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (2)
There is a total of n advertisers interested in buying advertising space on the
two TV channels. Let Aik denote advertiser k￿ s advertising level on channel i (such
9Utility function (1) is due to Shubik and Levitan (1980). The merit of using this utility function
is that market size does not vary with s. Our qualitative results would go through also with a
standard quadratic utility function, but then an increase in s would both reduce the size of the
market and increase the substitutability between the TV channels. See Motta (2004) for further
discussion.
10It is well documented that viewers try to avoid advertising breaks on TV, see Moriarty and
Everett (1994), Danaher (1995), and Wilbur (2008).
6that Ai =
Pn
k=1 Aik). The advertiser￿ s gross gain from advertising at channel i is
naturally increasing in its advertising level and in the number of viewers exposed to
its advertising. We make it simple by assuming that the gross gain equals ￿AikCi;
where ￿ > 0. This implies that the net gain for advertiser k from advertising on TV
equals
￿k = ￿ (A1kC1 + A2kC2) ￿ (r1A1k + r2A2k); (3)
where ri is the advertising price charged by TV channel i for one unit of advertising.
Maximizing (3) with respect to A1k and A2k; subject to (2), we ￿nd demand for
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As this expression shows, the number of advertisers merely serves to scale total
advertising demand. As a simpli￿cation, we therefore set n = 1.
We abstract from any costs for the TV channels and the distributor (except for
the access charges, which are only internal transfers). Joint pro￿ts for these ￿rms






where z = D;T:
To simplify the algebra we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: ￿ = 1:
The following can now be veri￿ed:
Remark 1: Joint pro￿ts for the distributor and the TV channels are maximized
for p = popt ￿ 1
2 and A = Aopt ￿ 0 (such that Gopt = 1
2) for any s 2 [0;1).
With ￿ = 1 (or ￿ < 1; for that matter) we thus ￿nd that joint pro￿ts are max-
imized by being advertising-free, and instead charge the viewers directly. A higher
value of ￿ would imply a greater demand for ads (since the bene￿t of advertising
would be higher), such that Aopt > 0 and popt < 1
2: Except for this, the value of ￿
does not matter for the qualitative results.
73.1 The distributor sets end-user prices
In case D, the distributor sets end-user prices. With this market structure, the




(pi ￿ f)Ci ￿ 2F and ￿i = riAi + fCi + F; i = 1;2; (5)
where f ? 0 and F ? 0 are the per-viewer fee and the ￿xed fee, respectively, that a
TV channel receives from the distributor.
At stage 3, each TV channel chooses its advertising price. Solving
@￿i
@ri = 0 gives
rise to the reaction function
ri(rj) =
1 + f ￿ pi ￿ srj
2(2 ￿ s)
; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (6)
Note that
dri(rj)
dpi < 0: an increase in pi reduces the audience and thus the advertising
demand on channel i, which in turn necessitates a lower advertising price. Secondly,
we have
dri(rj)
drj < 0: a higher advertising price on channel j implies that it will
have less advertising, and thus become more attractive to the viewers. This makes
the rival (channel i) relatively less attractive, such that it will have to reduce its
advertising price. Thereby
advertising prices are strategic substitutes.11
Solving (6) simultaneously for the two TV channels we ￿nd that advertising
prices are given by
ri =
(4 ￿ 3s)(1 + f) ￿ 2(2 ￿ s)pi + spj
(4 ￿ s)(4 ￿ 3s)
; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (7)
Equation (7) shows that channel i￿ s advertising price is decreasing in pi (
dri
dpi < 0), as
we should expect from the reaction function ri(rj). Furthermore, we see that
dri
dpj > 0
for s > 0: an increase in pj reduces channel j￿ s audience and therefore its advertising
price rj. With advertising prices being strategic substitutes, this increases ri.
Finally, note that
dri
df > 0: The reason for this is that the higher the per-viewer
price that the channel receives from the distributor, the more it gains from having
11This is a mechanism that is present in other models of the media market, see for example
Nilssen and Słrgard (2001), Gabszewicz et al. (2004), and Kind et al. (2009).
8a large audience. If f increases, it will thus charge a higher advertising price and
sell less advertising space (
dAi
df < 0) in order to attract a larger viewership. In the
continuation, we will put a cap on f to ensure that advertising is not brought down
to zero. In particular, we assume that f < f :=
(2￿s)(6￿s)
(10￿s)(4￿s): Below, we verify that
this in fact holds in equilibrium if f is set at its optimal value (despite the fact that
Aopt = 0).
At stage 2, the distributor chooses those p1 and p2 that maximize ￿, taking
(7) into account. Our problem has a unique symmetric solution, so we can omit




























The mere fact that the advertising volume is decreasing in the per-viewer fee
(dA
df < 0) allows the distributor to set an end-user price that is increasing in f. Ad-
ditionally, a higher f means that the distributor￿ s perceived marginal costs increase.
This magni￿es the positive relationship between p and f: Not surprisingly, we there-




than the one maximizing joint pro￿ts (Gopt = popt = 1=2), unless f is su¢ ciently
negative.
At stage 1, f is set such as to maximize aggregate pro￿ts for the distributor
and the TV channels. However, it might be argued that a per-viewer fee f 6= 0 is
di¢ cult to sustain because of problems of commitment: if the distributor and the
TV channels have agreed on a particular f, the distributor may have incentives to
meet with one of the channels in order to renegotiate the agreed-upon fee; see, e.g.,
Rey and VergØ (2008, Sec. 9.3.4) for a general discussion, and Armstrong (1999)
and Stennek (2007) for analyses of TV distribution with no per-viewer fees. We
therefore start out with considering the case where f is ￿xed at zero.
9Remark 2: Suppose that the wholesale contracts consist of a ￿xed fee only
(f = 0). Then advertising volumes are decreasing in s ( dA
ds < 0), while end-user
prices are independent of s (
dp
ds = 0).
The intuition for the results in Remark 2 is that the closer substitutes the TV
channels are, the more they will compete in having few advertising slots (and the
higher the advertising will prices be).12 This explains why dA
ds < 0: The distribu-
tor, on the other hand, internalizes the competition between the TV channels, and




We now turn to the case where the ￿rms pick f in order to maximize joint
pro￿ts. As noted in Remark 1, joint pro￿ts are maximized if there is no advertising
(A = Aopt = 0) and p = popt = 1=2. This outcome is in general not achievable since
￿rms are not allowed to collude on prices. However, at stage 1, they can in￿ uence
subsequent decisions on both advertising levels and end-user prices through their
choice of f. It should be noted, though, that the ￿rms face a trade-o⁄when they set
f: Equations (8) and (9) make it clear that a positive f will move the end-user price
in the wrong direction and the advertising volume in the correct direction compared
to ￿rst-best industry-optimum, and vice versa for a negative f. At the outset the
optimal sign of f is therefore not clear.
Intuition might nonetheless lead us to expect that f should be positive. The
reason for this is that a positive f has both a harmful and a bene￿cial e⁄ect on the
distributor￿ s pro￿t; on the one hand it tends to reduce his pro￿t margin, which is
bad, but on the other hand it also reduces the advertising volume, which is bene￿cial
for the distributor. At the same time a slightly positive f is unambiguously positive
12This result was ￿rst shown in Barros et al. (2004).
13The distributor could utilize the fact that dA
ds < 0 to let end-user prices be increasing in s
(
dp
ds > 0): However, this would excessively reduce the size of the audiences (recall that G > Gopt).
10for the TV channels.14 Setting d(￿ + ￿1 + ￿2)=df = 0, we ￿nd
f = f
￿ ￿
2(6 ￿ s)(2 ￿ s)
(4 ￿ s)
￿









By inserting for (10) into (8) and (9), we have:
Proposition 1. Suppose that f = f￿; such that it maximizes joint pro￿ts for
the distributor and the TV channels.
a) End-user prices and advertising levels are above industry optimum (p > popt
and A > Aopt)
b) The closer substitutes the TV channels are
- the lower are end-user prices (
dp
ds < 0)
- the lower are advertising levels ( dA
ds < 0).
Proposition 1 shows that end-user prices and advertising levels are closer to ￿rst-
best industry optimum the higher s is: This has the following interesting implication:
Corollary 1. Suppose that f = f￿: The closer substitutes the TV channels are,
the higher are joint pro￿ts ( d￿D
ds > 0) and the larger is the size of the audiences
( dC
ds > 0).
The property that dC
ds > 0 is well known from one-sided markets; a closer sub-
stitutability between goods increases the competitive pressure, and thus also con-
sumption. However, the result that joint pro￿ts are increasing in the substitutability
between the media products is in stark contrast to what we typically ￿nd in one-sided
markets. The intuition is that the distributor partly internalizes the competition
between the TV channels, since it sets the end-user prices for both channels. The
distributor cannot control advertising volumes, though, and these are too high from
the industry￿ s point of view. The reason is that each TV channel sells the amount
of advertising space that maximizes its own operating pro￿ts, without taking into
14To see these e⁄ects for the two groups of agents, we di⁄erentiate their pro￿ts with respect to









2(6￿s)2 f. From these expressions
we immediately see that it must be optimal to set f positive; a small increase in f from f = 0
yields a net increase in industry pro￿t equal to 2￿s
2(6￿s)(4￿s):
11account how this reduces income for the distributor (and the rival TV channel).
This is a negative vertical externality, but the stronger is the competition between
the TV channels, the less advertising will they carry. Tougher competition between
the TV channels thereby reduces the strength of the negative vertical externality,
and increases aggregate pro￿ts.
3.2 The TV channels set end-user prices
In case T, where the TV channels set end-user prices, joint pro￿ts of the distributor
and the TV channels equal
￿ = w(C1 + C2) ￿ 2W and ￿i = (pi ￿ w)Ci + riAi + W; (11)
where w is the price that the distributor receives from each TV channel per viewer.
Note that the access price w is modeled as a variable cost for the TV channels,
while the per-viewer fee f in the previous section is modeled as a variable cost for
the distributor.
At stage 3, each TV channel chooses its advertising price. Setting
@￿i
@ri = 0 yields
the reaction function
ri(rj) =
1 ￿ w ￿ srj
2(2 ￿ s)
; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j; (12)
where we again note that advertising prices are strategic substitutes (
dri(rj)
drj < 0).





; i = 1;2: (13)
At stage 2, the TV channels set viewer fees. The reaction function is now given
by
pi =
2(1 ￿ s) + (2 ￿ s)w + spj
2(2 ￿ s)
; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (14)




12Solving (14) simultaneously for i = 1;2, and dropping subscripts because of












(1 ￿ w); A =
s2
2(4 ￿ 3s)(4 ￿ s)
(1 ￿ w); and C =
16 ￿ 12s + s2
4(4 ￿ 3s)(4 ￿ s)
(1 ￿ w):
(16)
The end-user prices that the TV channels set at stage 2 are thus increasing in the
access price w. With higher end-user price, there is also naturally a smaller audience,
and thus a lower demand for advertising and a lower price of advertising.
Let us again, as we did in the analysis of market structure D, consider the case
without per-viewer fees, i.e., where w = 0: We have:
Remark 3: Suppose that the wholesale contracts consist of a ￿xed fee only
(w = 0). Then advertising volumes are increasing in s ( dA
ds > 0), while end-user
prices are decreasing in s (
dp
ds < 0). In the limit s ! 1 we have p = 0, in which
case the industry raises revenue only from the advertising market.
With w = 0; advertising becomes a more important source of revenue the closer
substitutes the TV channels are, while the opposite is true for viewer payments.
Note in particular that p = 0 if s = 1; competition presses end-user prices down to
zero if the consumers perceive the TV channels to be perfect substitutes. In this
case the industry earns pro￿ts solely from the advertising market. The reason why
the advertising market is pro￿table for the industry even if the channels are perfect
substitutes in the eyes of the viewers, is (as noted above) that advertising prices
are strategic substitutes. This is a relatively mild form of competition (see Kind et
al., 2009, for a thorough discussion). As a digression, it should be mentioned that
this can shed light on observations on the internet: arguably, readers perceive the
majority of online newspapers as having rivals which o⁄er close substitutes (s ￿ 1),
and such newspapers are thus only able to raise revenue from the advertising market.
Competition between the TV channels implies that end-user prices are too low
(p < popt) and advertising levels too high (A > Aopt) compared to industry optimum
13when w = 0 and s > 0. Since
dp
dw > 0 and dA
dw < 0 we should expect that w
must be positive in order to maximize joint pro￿ts. This is con￿rmed by solving


















2[4(2 ￿ s)(4 ￿ 3s)(4 ￿ s) + s4]
:





2 (4 ￿ 3s); r = M
￿
4(4 ￿ 3s) + s
2￿






4(4 ￿ 3s) + s
2￿





4(4 ￿ 3s) + s
2￿2 : (19)
Using equations (17)-(19), we can state:
Proposition 2. Suppose that w = w￿; such that it maximizes joint pro￿ts for
the distributor and the TV channels.
a) End-user prices are too low and advertising levels too high compared to indus-
try optimum (i.e., p < popt and A > Aopt) for s > 0.
b) The closer substitutes the TV channels are
- the lower are end-user prices:
dp
ds < 0.
- the higher are advertising levels: dA
ds > 0.
Independent of the value of w, the TV channels will compete so harshly if s ! 1
that end-user prices are equal to TV channels￿marginal costs (p = w): However,
since w￿ > 0 for all s > 0; the industry as a whole makes a positive pro￿t from
viewer charges no matter how close substitutes the TV channels are.
Note from equation (17) that w = 0 at s = 0. Each TV channel is in this case a
monopolist in its own market segment, and chooses end-user prices and advertising
prices that maximize both individual and aggregate industry pro￿ts (p = popt = 1=2
and A = Aopt = 0). For higher values of s there will be a deviation between
equilibrium prices and equilibrium advertising levels compared to industry optimum,
and more so the higher s is: It can thus be shown that:
14Corollary 2: Suppose that w = w￿. The closer substitutes the TV channels are,
the lower are joint pro￿ts ( d￿T
ds < 0) and the smaller is the size of the audiences
( dC
ds < 0).
It might seem surprising that w is set so low that p < popt for s 2 (0;1); by having
w somewhat higher than w￿, the TV channels would set end-user prices closer to
industry optimum. The same would be true for advertising levels, since A > Aopt
and dA=dw < 0: However, the larger s is, the lower the TV channels￿pro￿t margin
(p￿w) will be. This in turn gives the TV channels incentives to sell more advertising
space even though this reduces the size of the audiences. Setting w such that we
always have p = popt would therefore excessively increase viewers￿generalized price
and excessively reduce the number of viewers. It is therefore optimal to set w such
that p < popt. It should be noted, though, that this does not prevent the generalized





3 (8 ￿ 3s)
￿
4(4 ￿ 3s) + s
2￿
> 0: (20)
In contrast to market structure D (and to what we typically expect from analysis of
one-sided markets), the size of the audiences is thus smaller the better substitutes
are the TV channels.
4 A comparison
Let us now compare the two market structures. In market structure D, the distrib-
utor sets the end-user prices. Thereby the two TV channels￿viewer prices become
coordinated, but at the cost of not being coordinated with advertising prices. This
market structure thus exhibits horizontal ￿ but not vertical ￿ price coordination.
In market structure T, each TV channel coordinates the prices it charges from the
viewers and the advertisers, but at the cost of viewer prices being uncoordinated
across the channels. We might say this market structure exhibits vertical ￿ but
not horizontal ￿ price coordination. These di⁄erences in price coordination lead to
large di⁄erences in outcomes in the two market structures.
15We ￿rst consider the case where the contract between the distributor and the TV
channels only speci￿es ￿xed fees, with variable fees being equal to zero (f = w = 0).
The curves ￿D and ￿T in Figure 1 show joint pro￿ts under the two market structures
in this case. At s = 0, each TV channel is a monopolist in its own market segment,
and there do not exist any horizontal externalities. The market structure where
each TV channel sets both end user and advertising prices must then necessarily be
the most pro￿table one, and ensures that individual pro￿t-maximization coincides
with industry optimum. If s is close to 1, on the other hand, end-user prices are
pressed down to marginal costs if they are controlled by the channels. So if the
TV channels are su¢ ciently close substitutes, the market structure where end-user
prices are coordinated by the distributor is superior from the industry￿ s point of
view.
Figure 1: Joint pro￿ts if no variable access fees.
Let us now consider how the relative pro￿tability of the two market structures
changes if the variable fees are set at their optimal levels. In market structure D,
where TV channels control advertising prices only, they do not take properly into
account that a high advertising volume reduces the consumers￿willingness to pay
for watching TV. In Section 3 we thus showed that it is optimal (from the industry￿ s
point of view) to give the TV channels a positive variable income per viewer (f > 0)
and thus induce them to carry less adverting. The extent to which there is excessive
16advertising is, however, smaller the tougher is the competition between the TV
channels. We therefore found that
df
ds < 0, as shown by the downward-sloping curve
in the left-hand-side panel of Figure 2.
In market structure T, where TV channels set end-user prices, competition forces
the TV channels to set the end-user prices closer to the (perceived) marginal costs
the better substitutes they are. In order to reduce the extent to which competition
more or less eliminates pro￿ts from the viewer side of the market, the variable access
price w ￿ which is the per unit access price the TV channels pay to the distributor
￿ should therefore be increasing in s: dw
ds > 0. This is illustrated by the upward-
sloping curve in the left-hand-side panel of Figure 2.
Figure 2: Access prices and joint pro￿ts.
So which market structure performs better if the variable fees are set at their
optimal levels? Bargaining between the distributor and the TV channels could
make it possible to set w such that the end-user prices are identical in those two
market structures (pT = pD). However, recall from Section 3.1 that popt < pD:
Not surprisingly, it can therefore be shown that pT < pD when w is optimally
chosen.15 Thereby, excessively high end-user prices are avoided, with the result that
￿D > ￿T, no matter how close substitutes the TV channels are.16 The main reason
for this result is that the market structure where each TV channel sets prices in
15It is straightforward to show that pT < pD by inserting for f￿ in (8) and for w￿ in (15).
16Note that there are no negative vertical externalities with open networks, and that the negative
horizontal externalities are partly internalized under e¢ cient bargaining. Under market structure
D, on the other hand, there will always exist negative horizontal as well as vertical externalities.
17both markets directly addresses the two-sidedness of the market. The right-hand-
side panel of Figure 2 illustrates this by showing total industry pro￿t always being
higher in market structure T than in market structure D.
Also the consumers would gain from a shift to an open network. This is not
surprising, since end-user prices are then set competitively instead of by a price-
coordinating distributor. We can state:
Proposition 3: A shift from market structure D (distributor setting end-user
prices) to market structure T (TV channels setting end user prices) increases both
total industry pro￿t and consumer surplus.
Both consumer surplus and total industry pro￿t are increasing in s when the
distributor sets end-user prices (see Corollary 1), while the opposite is true when
the TV channels set end user prices (see Corollary 2). Both the industry and the
viewers thus have less to gain from a shift to open access the closer substitutes the
TV channels are.
When the distributor sets end-user prices, the TV channels￿only choice variable
is the advertising price. Stronger competition between the TV channels therefore
implies that they must adjust advertising prices so as to reduce advertising levels.
Proposition 1 consequently shows that the advertising volume is decreasing in s.
Under market structure T, on the other hand, the TV channels compete both in
end-user prices and advertising prices. Since competition in advertising prices is
weaker than competition in end-user prices, Proposition 2 shows that the advertising
volume is increasing in s in this case. Additionally, the generalized price is lower ￿
and thus the number of viewers higher ￿ when end-user prices are set by the TV
channels rather than by the distributor. This explains why the advertising volume is
higher under market structure T than under market structure D if the TV channels￿
products are su¢ ciently close substitutes (see the left-hand-side panel of Figure 3).
As a ￿nal comparison of the two market structures, the right-hand-side panel of





18If the TV channels￿products are completely unrelated (s = 0), then there will
be no advertising in market structure T: all revenue will be earned from the end-
user market. However, the stronger the competition between the channels, the less
important consumer payments will be as a source of revenue. It is worth stressing
once more, though, that if the variable access price were ￿xed at zero (w = 0), then
competition between the TV channels would drive revenue from the consumer side
of the market down to zero in the limit as s approaches 1; the only reason why the
industry is able to make the larger part of its revenue directly from the viewers even
for high values of s is that w has a positive value.
Figure 3: Advertising levels and revenue shares.
When the distributor sets end-user prices, we have the opposite picture; the
end-user prices are coordinated by the distributor and become increasingly more
important as a source of revenue as s increases, since the TV channels then compete
away most of their potential advertising revenues. If the TV channels￿products are
su¢ ciently close substitutes, consumer payments will therefore be relatively more
important in this market structure than in the market structure where the TV
channels set end-user prices.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 4: If the TV channels￿products are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated, a
shift from market structure D (distributor setting end-user prices) to market struc-
ture T (TV channels setting end-user prices) reduces the advertising volume and the
relative dependence on advertising revenue.
195 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have compared two ways of organizing pricing of TV distribution
to end-users. One of our ￿ndings is that a market structure where TV channels set
end-user prices might be favorable for both the industry and the viewers relative to
one in which the distributor sets end-user prices.17 Leaving the setting of viewer
prices to the distributor means that the TV channels￿viewer prices are coordinated,
but this approach does not solve the problem associated with the coordination of
viewer prices and advertising prices. As our analysis shows, the latter coordination
is of paramount importance for both the industry and the viewers.
The driving force behind our result is the two-sidedness of the TV industry, which
by now has been discussed in a number of theoretical and empirical analyses.18 As
stressed by Rochet and Tirole (2003), e¢ ciency in two-sided markets requires that
the ￿rms choose the correct price structures. This cannot be achieved if prices are
set by di⁄erent agents. Due to the externalities that viewers and advertisers exert
on each other, there is thus a gain from coordinating the prices that these two
customer groups are charged. It should be noted, though, that from the industry￿ s
point of view the present market structure has the advantage that it hinders direct
price competition between the TV channels in the end-user market. This horizontal
coordination problem with an open network can to some extent be resolved by
having high unit access prices, which the TV channels will partly pass on to the
end-users through higher viewer prices. This is why we arrive at the result that
open networks yield the highest joint industry pro￿t even if the consumers perceive
the TV channels as close substitutes.
17It might be argued that it is a violation of competition law to allow the TV channels to
determine the viewer prices charged by the distributors; this could be regarded as a retail price
maintenance (RPM) system. Many countries have had a restrictive policy towards RPM, but this
is gradually changing. For example, RPM is now treated with a rule of reason approach in the US
(see Blair, 2008). This suggests that the TV industry might be allowed to use RPM by arguing
that this is to the bene￿t of both the industry and the viewers.
18See Gabszewicz, et al. (2004), Anderson and Coate (2005), Kind, et al. (2007, 2009), and
Wilbur (2008), as well as the survey by Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006).
20However, lack of commitment might make it impossible to set a markup on access
prices. If so, it is not possible for the industry to use the per unit access price to
in￿ uence the end-user and the advertising prices. The per unit access price will then
be equal to marginal costs, and there is no scope for even an imperfect horizontal
coordination in an open network. In that case the present market structure, where
the distributor coordinates end-user prices, leads to higher pro￿ts for the industry
if the TV channels￿products are su¢ ciently close substitutes.
The industry￿ s mix of revenue raised from the advertising and viewer markets
is distinctly di⁄erent in the two market structures we discuss. This is easily seen if
we consider the consequences of TV channels￿products becoming closer substitutes.
In the present system this would imply that the TV channels compete tougher by
having fewer advertising slots. Since the distributor can prevent competition on
end-user prices, the result would be that a larger fraction of the revenues would
come from the end-user market. In an open network, the opposite is true. Tougher
competition leads to lower end-user prices. The industry must then rely more on
the revenues from the advertising market.
Our vision of TV distribution in this analysis has been as an intermediary be-
tween content consumers on the one side and the two-sided TV industry on the
other. An alternative picture has the distribution industry itself as a two-sided
market, with consumers gaining from the presence of more content providers in a
distributor￿ s portfolio, and content providers gaining from an increase in a distrib-
utor￿ s customer base. An example of this latter approach, applied to the internet
industry, is the work of Economides and T￿g (2009). They view internet service
provision as a two-sided market and ￿nd arguments in favour of net neutrality on
the internet. Our work can be related to theirs by noting that also on the internet
content provision is a two-sided market, with advertisers exerting a negative exter-
nality on content consumers, while the consumers exert a positive externality on
the advertisers. In this setting our results can be interpreted as arguing against net
neutrality, exactly because of these externalities between advertisers and content
consumers. By giving up on net neutrality, content providers and internet service
providers are better able to internalize these externalities.
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